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a b s t r a c t
Tomotivatemanagers to pursue shareholder interests, boardsmay
design management compensation packages to reward managers
for good ﬁrm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career con-
cerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy argue that it may not
be optimal for their current compensation to be too dependent on
ﬁrm performance. Testing this proposition, we ﬁnd that abnormal
returns are negatively related to the percentage of performance-
based pay of newly hired CEOs when companies announce CEO
successions. Since these newly hired CEOs are likely some distance
fromretirement,we interpret these results as being consistentwith
Gibbons and Murphy; it may be better to allow newly hired CEOs
to be paid in human capital increases from the managerial labor
market than to have their current pay too closely related to perfor-
mance.
© 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.
Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Agency problems exist in modern corporations because the goals and desires of managers may
not be consistent with those of shareholders. Managers, as a result, may not always use the ﬁrm’s
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capital in amanner thatmaximizes shareholderwelfare.Governancemechanismshaveevolved tohelp
align manager interests with those of shareholders. There are both internal and external governance
mechanisms. Our focus is on the effectiveness of one internal governance mechanism, the design of
manager pay packages for newly hired CEOs. Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out that it is more
important how you pay managers and less important how much they are paid. Pursuant to this view,
optimal contracting exists when compensation motivates managers to pursue shareholder wealth
maximization as the ﬁrm’s primary goal.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992), however, argue that career concerns for managers can affect the
importance of incentive contracts. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal incentive contract
is a combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentive from the
compensation contract. Career concerns are strongest when a CEO is farther from retirement; this
is likely the situation for most newly hired CEOs. In these cases, it may be optimal for current pay
to be less dependent upon performance because career concerns such as remaining competitive in
the managerial labor market may provide sufﬁcient motivation. However, when a manager is near-
ing retirement, the importance of career concerns fades. Here, motivation may need to come from
elsewhere such as from incentive-based pay.
Using a sample of 619 succession announcements between the years of 1991 and 2005, we test
the Gibbons and Murphy (1992) model by comparing the succession announcement period abnor-
mal returns to the compensation packages of successor CEOs. We ﬁnd results consistent with the
Gibbons and Murphy model; although the market reacts positively to succession announcements,
CEO succession announcement period abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of
performance-based pay for successor CEOs. In other words, the stock market reacts less positively to
contracts with considerable performance-based pay for new CEOs whose career concerns should be
high.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of optimal
incentive structure of CEO pay contracts. Section 3 describes our data and presents summary statis-
tics. Section 4 examines the cross-sectional relation between changes in CEO compensation structure
surrounding succession events and the returns that accompany the release of new information about
CEO succession. Section 5 investigates howchanges in CEO compensation structure relate to the career
concerns of the CEO. Section 6 presents robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Optimal incentive structure with career concerns
2.1. Agency problems and compensation
When managers do not operate ﬁrms to maximize shareholder wealth, costly agency problems
result. To mitigate agency problems there are both external (e.g. takeovers and proxy ﬁghts) and
internal solutions. One internal solution is a compensation plan that links management’s compen-
sation to the ﬁrm’s performance.3 However, designing a plan that aligns CEO interests with that of
shareholders is difﬁcult, and if it is poorly designed, it may lead tomanagerial entrenchment and poor
performance.
There has been considerable research on the design of CEO compensation packages. Morgan and
Poulsen (2001) ﬁnd that compensation plan announcements that align managerial compensation
to shareholder interests are associated with positive abnormal returns. Thus, shareholders seem to
beneﬁt when their CEO’s compensation depends on company performance.
CEOs may prefer to be paid in a less risky manner with pay not dependent on performance. When
insiders are on the compensation committee, managerial compensation is not as closely linked to
shareholder wealth (Newman & Mozes, 1999). Entrenched CEOs may bias their compensation struc-
ture towards low risk components that are not inﬂuenced by performance (Toyne, Millar, & Dixon,
2000).
3 There is not complete agreement on this point. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) posit that boards do not negotiate
with CEOs at arms-length; they maintain that powerful managers can heavily inﬂuence their own pay.
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2.2. Career concerns
CEO career concerns complicate the pay-for-performance debate. CEOs are paid both in current
compensation andalsowith increases in their humancapital. Nohel andTodd (2005) argue that human
capital is the present value of all future compensation gains or losses that are attributed to the man-
ager’s job performance. Managers that make good decisions, ones that increase shareholder wealth,
can be rewarded with current compensation and also an increase in their human capital. That is, in
the managerial labor market, managers that perform well will be rewarded with future increases in
income and managers that perform poorly will not be rewarded. As a result, career concerns can help
to alleviate agency problems because they help to align manager and shareholder interests (Fama,
1980; Holmstrom, 1982).
There is empirical evidence supporting the idea of human capital rewards. Hong and Kubik (2003),
for example, ﬁnd that security analysts that are good at forecasting company earnings are rewarded
by eithermoving tomore prestigious brokerage houses with greater pay or by being assigned to cover
more important stocks in their own brokerage house. Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999 ﬁnd that the
likelihood of a retired CEO remaining on his company’s board or serving on other boards is dependent
upon the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance while CEO.
Since CEOs are compensated with either current compensation or for increases in their human
capital, which form of compensation would be optimal? Gibbons and Murphy (1992) propose that
increases in human capital based on future compensation will be more important early in an execu-
tive’s career. For executives closer to retirement, concern for increases in human capital will be less
important. They state:
Accordingly, in the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract opti-
mizes total incentives—the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and
the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Because the implicit incentives from
career concerns are weakest for workers close to retirement, explicit incentives from the
optimal compensation contact should be strongest for such workers; for young workers,
it can be optimal for current pay to be completely independent of current performance
(p. 469).
2.3. Succession and career concerns
Since CEOs want low risk compensation and shareholders would likely prefer a CEO compensation
structure that reduces agency problems, the divergence must be resolved by negotiations between
the board and the CEO. A board may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to restructure an incumbent CEO’s contract due to
inertia, complacency, and the CEO’s inﬂuence over the board and the compensation committee. Unless
a sitting CEO is unhappy with the current contract, the CEO may use this inﬂuence to either stall the
renegotiation process or to redesign the pay package to reﬂect the CEO’s own interests. Changing the
compensation package with the incumbent CEO may be difﬁcult, bring conﬂict between the CEO and
theboard, andwill certainly involve difﬁcult negotiation.However,when aCEO succession takes place,
the board has an opportunity to make changes without conﬂict with a possibly powerful incumbent
CEO. Examining compensation for successor CEOs provides an opportunity to avoid the problems that
may occur when examining incumbent CEO compensation.
The successor CEO is new to the position and is likely a few years away from retirement. Following
the logic in Gibbons andMurphy (1992), it may not be optimal to align pay to performance too closely
when a CEO is newly hired.We propose thatwhen companies design the successor CEO compensation
contract with considerable pay-at-risk the market will react more negatively to the announcement
because career concerns are strong formost newly hired CEOs. In the presence of high career concerns,
there is less need for a large pay-at-risk component in the successor compensation contract. Thus, the
primary (career concerns) hypothesis of our paper is as follows:
H1. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of performance-based pay of younger
successor CEOs when companies announce CEO successions.
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2.4. Retention and career concerns
The alternative hypothesis is that a higher percentage of equity compensation is used by ﬁrms for
retention reasons, rather than to resolve potential agency issues through incentive alignment (Oyer
& Schaefer, 2003, 2005). For example, when an executive leaves for another company, this decision
will be partially inﬂuenced by the costs of leaving a current employer. Although not the only cost
incurred by an executive, a primarymonetary cost is the forfeiture of unvested equity compensation.4
However, new employers may reimburse executives for the monetary losses incurred by leaving a
current employer through either one-time equity grants or in higher future compensation. Still, the
greater the forfeiture amount involved, the less likely thenewemployermaybe to “make the executive
whole” by reimbursing him for the full value of lost equity compensation. Thus, current employers
justify high levels of equity-based compensation as a means to deter other potential employers from
hiring away key executives. This is especially true for more highly valued executives, such as CEOs.
The limited empirical research on this issue appears to support the retention justiﬁcation for high
levels of equity compensation. Mehran and Yermack (1999), for example, ﬁnd that option compen-
sation is inversely related to turnover. Similarly, Balsam and Miharjo (2007) ﬁnd that the value of
unexercisable in-the-money options and restricted shares is also inversely related to voluntary exec-
utive turnover. Furthermore, Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) examine the repricing of existing
options, apracticewhich ispartially justiﬁedbyﬁrms for retention reasons. Theyﬁnd that theexclusion
of the CEO in the repricing is likely to be associated with CEO departure.
However, while equity compensation may serve to increase the retention of executives, it is rea-
sonable to expect that it may have varying effects on executives at different points during their career.
For example, younger executives may be more willing to forfeit unvested equity compensation when
taking anewposition because theyhavemore years to recover any lost amounts. Thus, equity compen-
sation may be less effective as a retention tool in younger executives. As a result, the optimal contract
under the retention hypothesis would include a higher percentage of equity-based compensation for
the successor CEO when he is hired, relative to the predecessor.
We propose that, if considering retention issues is truly the best solution from an internal
contracting standpoint, then we would expect the market to react more positively to succession
announcements that have larger pay-at-risk for the successor because high level of pay-at-risk com-
pensation is inversely related to executive turnover. The market will react positively to the ﬁrm’s
attempts at retaining its top management and talent. However, this method may not be ideal when
dealing with young successor CEOs. Thus, the alternative (retention) hypothesis of our paper is as
follows:
H2. Abnormal returns are positively related to the percentage of performance-based pay of older
successor CEOs when companies announce CEO successions.
3. Data and summary statistics
To study the changes in CEO compensation structure surrounding CEO succession events, we iden-
tify CEO succession announcements from a LexisNexis search for the years of 1991–2005. We match
this data with data from the Execucomp database. Execucomp provides data on salary, bonus, option
grants, and total compensation for the top ﬁve executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) for
ﬁrms in S&P 500, S&PMidcap 400 and S&P Smallcap 600. Tominimize the inﬂuence of other factors in
our analysis of optimal incentive structure with career concerns, we limit our sample to successions
that occur following voluntary turnover.5 To determine the type of succession, we examine the col-
umn “REASON” in the Execucomp database, which explains why the named CEO left the company. It
provides four different reasons: resigned, retired, deceased, or unknown.We veriﬁed the reason listed
4 Additional monetary costs incurred by an executive include such things as a pension plan with payout structures tied to
years of service. Other costs include relocation costs, such as moving expenses and the sale of a home.
5 Forced successions may change the dynamics of the negotiation process between successor CEOs and their boards. Hence
we delete them from the sample to avoid any problems they may bring to the study.
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in Execucomp by searching the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) for
the reasons for the succession. From the news stories, we classify voluntary successions as all CEO
successions arising from retirement (CEOs over age 60),6 death, illness, or those involving the CEO’s
departure for a better and more prestigious position in another ﬁrm. Our ﬁnal sample includes 619
succession announcements between the years of 1991 and 2005.
3.1. Cumulative abnormal returns
To determine the stock market’s reaction to announcements of CEO succession announcements
we utilize event methodology. We deﬁne day 0 to be the succession announcement date. We use the
single index market model to predict returns:
Rit = ˛i + ˇi(Rmt) + eit (1)
where Rit = the return on security i at time t; ˛i = the estimated intercept for security i’s regression
equation; ˇi = the estimated slope for security i’s regression equation; Rmt = the return on the market
at time t as proxied by the equally weighted index available from CRSP; and eit = the error term from
the regression for company i at time t.
We estimate the regression over the period −120 to −31 relative to the announcement date, day
0. We then obtain the abnormal return for security i at time t as follows:
ARit = Rit − (˛i − ˇiRmt) (2)
We compute abnormal returns from day −30 to day +30. We compute the cumulative abnormal
return for security i, CARi, over various intervals T1i to T2i as
CARi =
T2i∑
t=T1i
ARit (3)
For a sample of N securities we obtain the mean cumulative abnormal return, CAR, as
CAR =
∑N
i=1CARi
N
(4)
If there is no abnormal stockpricemovement, then theCARwouldbe zero. To test if theCAR arenon-
zero, we use the Patell Z-statistic. We also count the number of positive and negative CARi and use a
generalized Z-statistic to determine if the number of positive CARi is different from the expected value.
The expected value would be 50% positive and 50% negative in the absence of abnormal performance.
Table 1 contains theCAR estimates for various intervals around theCEO succession announcements.
We compute abnormal returns for this group of ﬁrms centered on the CEO succession announcement
day, day 0. Over the interval, −1 to +1, the CAR is 0.93%. Its Z-statistic is 6.440 which is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level. Over this interval, there are 358 positive CARi and 261 that are negative.
The Z-statistic for the generalized sign test is 5.042 (signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level) and suggests that
the number of positive CARi did not occur by chance. The CAR on day 0 is 0.42%. Its Z-statistic is 5.345
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level. In addition, on this day, the number of positive CARi
is 339 and 280 are negative. The Z-statistic for the generalized sign test is 3.513 which is signiﬁcant
at the 0.001 level. The number of positive CARi is unlikely to have occurred by chance.
Under current reporting standards, ﬁrms have 4 days to report material changes in a named exec-
utive ofﬁcer’s employment contract in an 8-k ﬁling. Since information about compensation might not
be released for a few days after the succession announcement, we also report results for the interval
6 We consider the age 60 to be the normal retirement age for a CEO as in Parrino (1997). However, in additional unreported
testswe use age 65 as the normal retirement age. There are 208 CEOs between the ages of 60 and 65 in our sample. Nevertheless,
the results are similar when using age 65.
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Table 1
Cumulative abnormal returns for voluntary CEO succession announcements.
Days N Cumulative abnormal return Positive:negative Patell Z Generalized sign Z
(−30, +30) 619 1.74% 329:290 2.501** 2.709**
(−30, −2) 619 0.40% 330:289 0.577 2.789**
(−5, −2) 619 −0.11% 293:326 −0.762 −0.188
(−1, 0) 619 0.54% 359:260 5.154*** 5.123***
(−1, +1) 619 0.93% 358:261 6.440*** 5.042***
(0, +5) 619 0.93% 326:293 4.432*** 2.467**
(−1) 619 0.13% 310:309 1.944* 1.180
(0) 619 0.42% 339:280 5.345*** 3.513***
(+1) 619 0.38% 298:321 3.866*** 0.214
“Days” represents thenumber of days before andafter theCEOsuccession announcementday (day0). “N” represents thenumber
of CEO succession announcements. “Cumulative abnormal return” represents the cumulative abnormal stock price movement
around the CEO succession announcement day. “Positive:negative” represents the number of positive to negative cumulative
abnormal returns around the CEO succession announcement day. Patell Z-statistic is used to test if the cumulative abnormal
returns are non-zero. Generalized sign Z is used to determine if the number of positive cumulative abnormal returns is different
from the expected value.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, using a 1-tail test.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 levels, using a 1-tail test.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level, using a 1-tail test.
0 to +5. The abnormal return over this interval is 0.93% and is signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level.7 Overall,
our results are consistent with the explanation that the market values these successions positively.
3.2. CEO and ﬁrm characteristics
We have proposed that when a CEO leaves an organization and the board appoints a successor, the
board has an opportunity to restructure the contract in an optimal manner. Howmuch change occurs
from the predecessor’s contract will likely depend onmany factors, and it may be necessary to control
for how these other factors inﬂuence the returns that accompany the release of new information
aboutCEOchanges.Wegroup these factors intoCEOcompensation characteristics, CEOcharacteristics,
board characteristics, and ﬁrm characteristics. We examine the changes in these factors around CEO
succession within the same ﬁrm. Thus, we are able to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
3.2.1. CEO compensation characteristics
We examine the various components of compensation surrounding the succession for both the
predecessor and the successor (i.e. years −1 and +1). As a result, the compensation for the predecessor
is measured in the ﬁscal year prior to the succession year and the compensation for the successor is
measured as of the ﬁscal year following the succession year. We ignore the transition year (i.e. year 0)
since the transition year compensation data may include partial year compensation or compensation
for those individuals holding positions other than CEO within the ﬁrm during the year. In addition,
year 0 compensation may include extra compensation for the successor CEO for lost options at their
old ﬁrm and may contain departure compensation for the predecessor CEO.
As shown in Table 2 , we observe that the average percentage of equity-based pay for successors
is 35.57%, while the average for predecessors is 25.17%, representing an average increase of approxi-
mately 10.39% in equity-based compensation for the incoming CEO. However, we also observe from
Table 2 that this difference is 5.12% less for ﬁrms with a positive CAR.8 This result supports the career
concerns hypothesis. In both cases, the difference in percentage of equity-based pay is signiﬁcant.
7 Firms often ﬁle their 8-k within a shorter period of time. For robustness we also rerun our regression results using the CAR
for a 6-day announcement window (days 0 to +5). Our conclusions are unchanged and are reported in Appendix A.
8 The difference is approximately 12.57% less for ﬁrms in the lowest CAR quartile versus those in the highest CAR quartile.
Please
cite
th
is
article
in
p
ress
as:Elsaid
,E.,etal.C
EO
com
p
en
sation
stru
ctu
re
follow
in
g
su
ccession
:
Evid
en
ce
of
op
tim
al
in
cen
tives
w
ith
career
con
cern
s.Q
uarterly
R
eview
of
Econom
ics
and
Finance
(2009),d
oi:10.1016/j.qref.2009.08.004
A
RTICLE IN PRESS
G
 M
odel
Q
U
A
EC
O
-550;
N
o.of
Pages21
E.Elsaid
et
al./The
Q
uarterly
R
eview
ofEconom
ics
and
Finance
xxx
(2009)
xxx–xxx
7
Table 2
Sample statistics.
Panel A: all successions
Successor Predecessor
Variable N Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. Difference t-Statistic
Restricted Stock % 583 5.28% 0.00% 13.41% 3.94% 0.00% 12.37% 1.34% 1.99**
Stock Options % 583 30.29% 26.09% 29.78% 21.23% 4.25% 26.77% 9.06% 6.30***
Equity-Based Compensation % 583 35.57% 33.64% 30.50% 25.17% 16.21% 27.69% 10.39% 7.07***
Increase in Equity Comp. % (Successor) = 1 583 55.57% 100.00% 49.73% – – – – –
Equity-Based Compensation $ (000) 583 1734.19 389.53 7087.18 787.07 124.93 1892.22 947.12 3.21***
Total Compensation $ (000) 583 3004.61 1565.73 7844.26 891.22 666.95 724.47 2113.40 6.58***
CEO Age 583 51.17 51.00 6.69 59.98 61.00 7.68 −8.81 −21.80***
CEO Tenure (Predecessor) 583 – – – 9.83 7.50 8.48 – –
CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1 583 22.98% 0.00% 42.11% – – – – –
CEO Duality =1 583 27.27% 0.00% 44.57% 73.76% 100.00% 44.03% −46.48% −16.39***
% Outside Directors 583 62.13% 63.64% 17.07% 62.45% 64.29% 17.38% −0.32% −0.86
Board Size 583 9.95 10.00 2.83 10.03 10.00 2.97 −0.08 −1.32
# Board Meetings 583 7.71 7.00 2.99 7.25 7.00 3.05 0.46 4.17***
Outside Director Tenure 583 48.53 45.00 32.17 50.32 46.00 33.99 −1.79 −3.04***
% Outside Directors on Comp Comm. 583 86.25% 100.00% 21.07% 85.39% 100.00% 21.96% 0.86% 1.34
Comp Comm. Size 583 3.74 4.00 1.42 3.69 4.00 1.47 0.05 1.23
# Comp Comm. Meetings 583 4.03 4.00 2.40 3.74 3.00 2.41 0.29 3.32***
Board Strength 583 0.00 0.05 0.87 0.00 0.10 0.89 0.00 0.00
Total Assets (Mil) 583 3907.63 1074.92 8250.10 3543.61 889.58 7832.01 364.03 5.24***
Leverage (%) 583 24.83% 23.68% 22.04% 23.88% 23.43% 18.46% 0.95% 1.50
Ind. Adj. ROA 583 1.42 −0.02 77.76 −2.05 0.09 31.95 3.47 1.00
Tobin’s Q 583 0.25 0.25 0.60 0.21 0.23 0.34 0.04 2.57**
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Table 2 (Continued )
Panel B: split by CAR (−1, +1)
Split by −/+ CAR (−1, +1) Split by quartiles: CAR (−1, +1)
Difference Difference
Variable Negative Positive F-Statistic Low 2nd low 2nd high High F-Statistic
Restricted Stock % 3.17% 0.02% 5.41** 3.19% 2.50% 1.24% −1.62% 2.49*
Stock Options % 10.21% 8.23% 0.46 11.97% 7.60% 12.24% 4.21% 1.78
Equity-Based Compensation % 13.37% 8.25% 2.97* 15.16% 10.09% 13.48% 2.59% 3.61**
Increase in Equity Comp. % (Successor) = 1 57.79% 53.98% 0.83 58.90% 55.56% 58.67% 48.95% 1.26
Equity-Based Compensation $ (000) 932.76 957.45 0.00 683.88 953.57 747.65 1418.61 0.31
Total Compensation $ (000) 2275.86 1996.46 0.18 2259.79 2035.22 1516.51 2668.78 0.56
The successor compensation variables are measured at year +1 and the predecessor compensation variables are measured at year −1. “Restricted Stock %” represents the CEO restricted
stock grants as a percentage of the CEO total compensation. “Stock Options %” represents the CEO stock option grants as a percentage of the CEO total compensation. “Equity-Based
Compensation %” represents the sum of the CEO restricted stock grants and stock options grants measured as a percentage of the CEO total compensation. “Increase in Equity Comp.
(%) (Successor =1)” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor’s compensation contract is composed of a greater percentage of equity-based compensation than that of the
predecessor at year +1 for the successor and at year −1 for the predecessor. “Equity-Based Compensation $ (000)” represents the sum of the CEO restricted stock grants and stock options
grants (in thousands of dollars). “Total Compensation $ (000)” represents the sum of the CEO salary, bonus, other annual pay, restricted stock grants, stock option grants and long-term
incentive payouts (in thousands of dollars). “CEO Age” represents the CEO age at year 0. “CEO Tenure (Predecessor)” represents the number of years the predecessor held the CEO position.
“CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor is an outsider and equal to 0 otherwise. “CEO Duality =1” represents a dummy variable equal to
1 if the CEO holds the title of both CEO and Chairman of the board. The successor board variables are measured at year 0 and the predecessor board variables are measured at year −2. “%
Outside Directors” represents the number of outside directors serving on the board as a percentage of total directors on the board. “Board Size” represents the number of directors on the
board. “# Board Meetings” represents the number of times the board of directors met. “Outside Director Tenure” represents the sum of the director tenure of all outside directors serving
on the board. “% Outside Directors on Comp Comm.” represents the number of outside directors serving on the board as a percentage of total directors on the board. “Comp Comm. Size”
represents the number of directors on the compensation committee. “# Comp Comm. Meetings” represents the number of times the compensation committee met. “Board Strength” is a
factor loading variable using factor analysis to combine % Outside Directors, the inverse of Board Size, # Board Meetings, Outside Director Tenure, % Outside Directors on Comp Comm.,
the inverse of Comp Comm. Size, and # Comp Comm. Meetings. “Total Assets (Mil)” represents the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s total asset size (in millions of dollars) at year +1 for the
successor and at year −1 for the predecessor. “Leverage” represents the ﬁrm’s leverage at year +1 for the successor and at year −1 for the predecessor. “Ind. Adj. ROA” represents the ﬁrm’s
industry adjusted return on assets at year +1 for the successor and at year −1 for the predecessor. “Tobin’s Q” represents the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q at year +1 for the successor and at year −1
for the predecessor. “CAR (−1, +1)” represents the CEO succession announcement cumulative abnormal return from day −1 to day +1.
* Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 10%.
** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 5%.
*** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 1%.
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3.2.2. CEO Characteristics
We obtain data on CEO characteristics from Execucomp and ﬁrm proxy statements. The tenure
and age of the CEO may determine his or her effectiveness in managing the ﬁrm. Alderfer (1986)
suggests that top ofﬁcials with little experience have limited effectiveness because it takes time to
gain an understanding of the companies. Older CEOs or those with longer tenure may have a greater
understanding of the ﬁrm and its industry. This could translate into better ﬁrm performance. We
calculate predecessor CEO tenure as the difference between the year of the observation and the year
in which the executive became CEO. The average CEO tenure of the predecessor CEO is 9.83 years. We
calculate the age of both the successor and predecessor CEO as their age in the year of the succession
announcement. The average age of the successor is 51.17 years,9 while the average of the predecessor
in their departure year is 59.98 years. The average difference of 8.81 years between successor CEOs
and their predecessors is signiﬁcant.
Wedeterminewhether the successor CEO joined the company from theoutside. Outside succession
seems to occur more frequently following poor performance (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella &
Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Worrell, & Dutia, 1993; Parrino, 1997). By hiring an outsider, the board
may be sending “a signal that a major change is necessary and that no insider can bring the fresh
perspective that is required” (Vancil, 1987, p. 57). Accordingly, we set a dummy variable equal to one
in cases where the CEO joined the company from the outside. On average, 22.98% of the CEOs joined
the company from the outside.
Finally, we determine whether or not the successor or predecessor CEO holds the title of CEO and
chairman, CEO duality. CEO duality may concentrate power in the CEO’s position, allowing the CEO
to potentially control information available to other board members, which may impede effective
monitoring (Jensen, 1993). We create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the title
of Chairman of the Board. On average, 27.27% of successor CEOs hold the title of CEO and chairman
versus 73.76% of predecessor CEOs. Duality is removed in 58% of successions, duality remains the same
in 31.18% of succession, and duality is added in 10.82% of successions.
3.2.3. Board characteristics
Board strength can be proxied by several variables.We combine severalmeasures of board strength
with a factor analysis as in Elsaid and Davidson (2009) so that we have one board strength variable.
Our proxies for board strength that we use in the factor analysis include the percent of independent
directorson theboard, thepercent independentdirectorson the compensationcommittee, theaverage
tenure of the independent directors, the size of the board, the size of the compensation committee,
the number of board meetings and the number of compensation committee meetings. We measure
each of these variables as discussed below.
We use the ﬁrm’s proxy statements for year −2 and year 0 to determine the composition of the
board of directors and compensation committee. We lag the measurement of board composition by
1 year relative to the measurement of CEO compensation because the CEO compensation package is
determined during the previous year (Newman & Mozes, 1999; Sridharan, 1996).
Jensen (1993) argues that smaller boards are more effective monitors of the CEO’s actions because
large boards place a greater emphasis on “politeness and courtesy”, making them easier for the CEO
to control. Studies have shown that smaller board size and compensation committee size positively
impact ﬁrmperformance (Yermack, 1996), aswell as the number of board and compensation commit-
teemeetings (Vafeas, 1999; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003).Wemeasure board size and compensation
committee size as the number of directors serving on the board or compensation committee during
the year. We determine the number of board and compensation committee meetings, measured as
the number of board or compensation committee meetings during the year. We ﬁnd that the average
size of the board of directors for the predecessor CEO and successor CEO are 10.03 and 9.95, respec-
tively. Also, the compensation committee for the predecessor is composed of 3.69 members and the
compensation committee for the successor CEO has 3.74 members.
9 The youngest successor was 29 years old and the oldest was 79.
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Boards dominated by outside directors are likely to be more independent, bring greater breadth of
experience to the ﬁrm, and be in a better position to monitor and control managers than boards
dominated by inside directors. Several studies link the proportion of outside directors to board
decision-making (e.g. Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt,
1990).We classify directors as insiders (employed by the ﬁrm), afﬁliated (e.g. former employees, fam-
ilymembers of employees, or thosewithbusiness relationswith theﬁrm), and independent (Baysinger
& Butler, 1985). We then create a variable for the percentage of outside directors serving on the board
calculated as the proportion of outside directors relative to total directors on the board.We also create
a variable for the percentage of outside directors serving on the compensation committee, calculated
as the proportion of outside directors relative to total directors on the compensation committee. The
percentage of outside directors serving on the board for the predecessor and successor are similar,
averaging 62.45% and 62.13%, respectively. On average the percentage of outside boardmembers serv-
ing on the compensation committee for the predecessor and successor are similar, averaging 85.39%
and 86.25%, respectively.
Finally, wemeasure the tenure of outside directors serving on the board, which is measured as the
number of years each outside director has served as a director with the ﬁrm.We then create an overall
measure of outside director tenure,which is the sum the director tenure of all outside directors serving
on the board. We ﬁnd that on average, the tenure of outside directors serving on the board declines
from 50.32 years to 48.53 years, for the predecessor and successor observation periods, respectively.
We combine these individual variables with a factor model. We ﬁrst construct each board variable
so that a larger value implies greater board strength. We use the variables discussed above except
we use the inverse of board size and inverse of compensation committee size so that a larger value
equates to a stronger board. The factor analysis produces a factor loading variable whose value ranges
from −2.90 to 2.03 for the predecessor and −2.89 to 2.04 for the successor. A larger factor loading
value implies a stronger board. Combining the board variables in this manner allows us to measure
overall board strength in one variable.10
3.2.4. Firm characteristics
We use the Compustat database to obtain data on ﬁrm characteristics in year −1 and +1. We then
measure the industry-adjusted ROA (Barber & Lyon, 1996), leverage, ﬁrm size, and Tobin’sQ. Industry-
adjusted performance measures have been used to capture the relative performance evaluation in
compensation contracts (Blackwell, Brickley, & Weisbach, 1994; Mehran, 1995). We deﬁne the ROA
as net proﬁts divided by the book value of assets and adjusted it for the industry median using four-
digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are not at least three other ﬁrms in the same
four-digit SIC code. Our leveragemeasure is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, our proxy
for ﬁrm size is the logarithm of the book value of assets, and we calculate Tobin’s Q using the method
in Chung and Pruitt (1996). We ﬁnd that on average ﬁrm size increases by $364.03 million between
predecessor and successor observation periods. On average, Tobin’s Q also increases by 0.04 between
the predecessor and successor observation periods. Both of these increases are signiﬁcant.
4. Market reactions to changes in compensation structure
Wenowexaminewhether the structure of the successor CEO’s compensation contract is associated
with abnormal stock returns after controlling for CEO and ﬁrm speciﬁc factors. The model we test is
as follows:
CAR(−1,+1)it = ˇ1(CEO’s Equity-Based Compensation%)it + ˇk(Controls)it
+ˇi
∑
(2-digit SIC dummyvariables)i + ˇy
∑
(year dummyvariables)t + εit
(5)
10 We could have alternately created an index of our own from these variables, but this would have required our judgment
and possible bias about which of these variables is more important in determining board strength.
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where the abnormal announcement return in the 3-days around the CEO succession announcement,
CAR (−1, +1), is a function of the successor CEO’s equity-based compensation % (measured by total
equity-based compensation %, restricted stock %, stock options %, or increase in equity-based compen-
sation %), controls (CEO Age, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the title of chairman
(CEO Duality), a dummy variable equal to 1 if successor CEO joined the company from the outside
(New CEO is Outsider), a factor loading variable for the strength of the board (Board Strength), the log
of total assets (LN Assets), long-term debt divided by book value of assets (Leverage (%)), the industry
adjusted return on assets (Ind. Adj. ROA), and (Tobin’s Q), dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code and
year (not reported in the tables). We compute t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at
the industry level (see Rogers, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). Our primary variable of interest in Eq. (5) is
the coefﬁcient on the successor CEO’s equity-based compensation % (EBC%), ˇ1. A ﬁnding of a negative
relation between EBC% and the CAR is consistent with the career concerns hypothesis (H1). However,
a ﬁnding of a positive relation between EBC% and the CAR would be consistent with the retention
hypothesis (H2).11
Table 3 reports results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of regression Eq. (5). Regressions
1 and 4 include the total percentage of equity compensation in the successor’s compensation contract
and a dummy variable equal to one if the successor’s compensation contract is composed of a greater
percentage of equity-based pay than his predecessor, respectively. The estimated coefﬁcients on both
total equity-based compensation percentage measures are negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% and
10% levels, respectively. The results suggest that a 1% increase in total equity-based compensation
is associated with an average decrease in the 3-day CAR of 3.03%. Also, those ﬁrms increasing the
percentage of equity-based compensation paid to the successor CEO have 3-day CAR that average 1.3%
less than those decreasing the percentage of total equity-based compensation. Consistent with the
univariate results, the negative estimated coefﬁcients suggest that larger increases in equity-based
compensation are awarded with less positive succession abnormal returns. These results support the
career concerns hypothesis.
Next we divide equity-based compensation into its two primary components, restricted stock and
stock options. Regressions 2 and 3 include the percentage of restricted stock and stock options for the
successor, respectively. The estimated coefﬁcient for Restricted Stock % is negative but not signiﬁcant.
However, the estimated coefﬁcient for Stock Option % is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
results suggest that a 1% increase Stock Option % in the successor’s pay contract is associated with an
average decrease in the 3-day CAR of 2.9%. This result supports the career concerns hypothesis.12
Overall, our results suggest that themarket reacts less favorably to CEO succession announcements
where the successor CEO’s contract contains a high percentage of equity-based compensation or an
increase in the percentage of equity-based compensation relative to the predecessor CEO.13
5. Evidence of career concerns
While our results in the previous section provide support for the career concerns hypothesis, this
hypothesis also predicts a more negative market reaction to increases in equity-based compensation
for younger successor CEO’s. The reason for this is that incoming CEO’s have much stronger external
11 The negative market reaction may also be driven by the difference in compensation structure between the successor CEO’s
and the predecessor CEO’s pay contract or suboptimal characteristics of only the predecessor CEO’s contract (i.e. too little
equity-based compensation). The estimated coefﬁcients on the difference in compensation structure between the successor
and predecessor are negative and signiﬁcant. However, the estimated coefﬁcients on the predecessor CEO’s compensation
structure are not signiﬁcant. This suggests that the negative market reaction is driven by the structure of the successor CEO’s
pay contract. The results are reported in Appendix A.
12 The ﬁnding of only a signiﬁcant market reaction to stock options may reﬂect the increased use of this form of equity-based
compensation during our sample period. For example, while the average real (inﬂation-adjusted) pay package of CEOs of S&P
500 ﬁrms more than quadrupled from $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million in 2000, the value of stock options granted to CEOs
increased nine-fold over the same period (Hall & Murphy, 2003).
13 To testwhether themarketmay be reacting to the dollar value of pay rather than pay structure,we include variables for total
equity-based compensation in dollars ($) and total compensation in dollars ($). The estimated coefﬁcients on both variables are
not signiﬁcant. The results are reported in Appendix A.
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Table 3
Market reaction to successor CEO compensation structure.
Independent variable Dependent variable =CAR (−1, +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Equity-Based Comp. (%) −0.0303**
(−2.32)
Restricted Stock (%) −0.0136
(−0.93)
Stock Options (%) −0.0292**
(−2.19)
Increase in Equity Comp. (%) −0.0135*
(−1.97)
CEO Age 0.000222 0.000344 0.000214 0.000245
(0.40) (0.59) (0.37) (0.43)
CEO Duality −0.00873 −0.00849 −0.00859 −0.00955
(−1.30) (−1.26) (−1.27) (−1.46)
CEO is Outsider 0.0232*** 0.0223*** 0.0226*** 0.0220***
(2.97) (2.96) (2.90) (2.92)
Board Strength −0.00489 −0.00418 −0.00534 −0.00417
(−1.49) (−1.29) (−1.63) (−1.28)
LN (Assets) 0.00474* 0.00338 0.00468* 0.00376
(1.83) (1.21) (1.79) (1.42)
Leverage (%) 0.000312* 0.000306* 0.000308* 0.000297*
(1.92) (1.95) (1.94) (1.82)
Ind. Adj. ROA −0.0000124 −0.0000119 −0.0000122 −0.00000969
(−1.16) (−1.09) (−1.10) (−0.83)
Tobin’s Q −0.00433 −0.00431 −0.00427 −0.00420
(−1.19) (−1.10) (−1.17) (−1.16)
2-Digit SIC Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 583 583 583 583
Adj. R2 0.056 0.036 0.053 0.047
Dependent variables: “CAR (−1, +1)” is the dependent variable for the ﬁrst six regressions and represents the CEO succession
announcement cumulative abnormal return from day −1 to day +1.
Independent variables: “Total Equity-Based Comp. (%)” represents the successor’s total equity compensation measured as a
percentage of total compensation measured at year +1. “Restricted Stock (%)” represents the successor’s restricted stock grants
measured as a percentage of total compensation measured at year +1. “Stock Options (%)” successor’s stock option grants
measured as a percentage of total compensation measured at year +1. “Increase in Equity Comp. (%)” represents a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the successor’s compensation contract is composed of a greater percentage of equity-based compensation
than that of the predecessor at year +1 for the successor and at year −1 for the predecessor. “CEO Age” represents the CEO age
at year 0. “CEO Duality =1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds the title of both CEO and Chairman of the
board. “CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor is an outsider and equal to
0 otherwise. “Board Strength” is a factor loading variable using factor analysis to combine % Outside Directors, the inverse of
Board Size, # Board Meetings, Outside Director Tenure, % Outside Directors on Comp Comm., the inverse of Comp Comm. Size,
and # Comp Comm. Meetings. “Total Assets (Mil)” represents the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s total asset size (in millions of
dollars) at year +1. “Leverage” represents the ﬁrm’s leverage at year +1. “Ind. Adj. ROA” represents the ﬁrm’s industry adjusted
return on assets at year +1.“Tobin’s Q” represents the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q at year +1. All regressions include dummy variables for
2-digit SIC and year (not reported in the tables). Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 10%.
** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 5%.
*** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 1%.
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market incentives and the optimal pay contract should therefore use a much lower percentage of
equity-based pay. Thus, if the negative market reaction is due to a suboptimal incentive contract
given the career concerns of the successor CEO, then we would expect a signiﬁcant negative market
reaction for younger CEO.14
The successorCEO’s compensation contract, however,maybeheavily dependent on the structureof
the predecessor CEO’s compensation contract in that itmay be difﬁcult for the board tomake dramatic
changes. According to the career concerns hypothesis the larger the difference in age between the
successor CEO and the predecessor CEO, the greater the successor CEO’s compensation contract may
deviate from the optimal contract under this condition because the implicit incentives provided by the
career concerns of the incoming (successor) CEO are considerably stronger than those of the outgoing
(predecessor) CEO. To test this prediction, we create a change in CEO age variable (CEO Age) equal
to the difference between the age of predecessor CEO and successor CEO, as well as an interaction
variable between CEO Age and equity-based compensation % (CEO Age×EBC%). The model we test
is as follows:
CAR(−1,+1)it = ˇ1(CEO’s EBC %)it + ˇ2(CEOAge)it + ˇ3(CEOAge × EBC%)it
+ˇk(Controls)it + ˇi
∑
(2-digit SIC dummyvariables)i
+ˇy
∑
(year dummyvariables)t + εit (6)
where the abnormal announcement return in the 3-days around the CEO succession announcement,
CAR (−1, +1), is a function of the successor CEO’s equity-based compensation % (measured by total
equity-based compensation % (EBC%), the difference in the age of the predecessor CEO and successor
CEO (CEO Age), an interaction variable between CEO Age and equity-based compensation % (CEO
Age×EBC%), controls (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the title of chairman (CEO
Duality), a dummy variable equal to 1 if successor CEO joined the company from the outside (New
CEO is Outsider), a factor loading variable for the strength of the board (Board Strength), the log of total
assets (LN Assets), long-term debt divided by book value of assets (Leverage (%)), the industry adjusted
return on assets (Ind. Adj. ROA), and (Tobin’s Q), dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code and year (not
reported in the tables). We compute t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the industry
level (see Rogers, 1993;Wooldridge, 2002). Our primary variable of interest in Eq. (6) is the coefﬁcient
on the interaction variable between CEO Age and equity-based compensation % (CEO Age×EBC%),
ˇ3. A ﬁnding of a negative relation between the interaction variable and the CAR is consistent with
the career concerns hypothesis (H1). However, a ﬁnding of a positive relation between the interaction
variable and the CAR would be consistent with the retention hypothesis (H2).
Also, as an additional test, we examine the market reaction to equity-based pay for the successor
CEO using two subsamples split at median successor CEO age.15
Table 4 , Panel A, Regression 1 reports results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of regression
Eq. (6). The estimated coefﬁcient on total equity-based compensation is negative and signiﬁcant (at
the 1% level) and the estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction variable (CEO Age×EBC%) is negative
and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). The market reacts less favorably to high levels of equity-based
compensation for the successor CEO and the market reaction is more negative when the change in
age between the predecessor CEO and successor CEO is higher. This supports the career concerns
hypothesis.
14 If thenegativemarket reaction is causedby the increasedagencycostsor risk-aversioneffects associatedwith thepercentage
of equity-based pay, then we would not expect a negative market reaction for younger CEOs. Our results are not consistent
with either of these explanations.
15 Wealso conduct tests using the interactionbetween the successor CEO’s equity-basedpay%and the successor CEO’s age. The
estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. However, CEO agemaymoderate the effect of CEO equity-based
pay in several different ways (i.e. linear, quadratic, or step-wise). The presence of measurement error in either the independent
or moderator variable may complicate the analysis and result in low power in the test of interactive effects (Baron & Kenny,
1986). Therefore, we report results using a subsample approach to examine themoderating effect of successor CEO age.We also
conduct additional tests using subsamples split at successor age (≤45, 45–50, 50–55, 55–60, and >60 years). Our conclusions
are unchanged. We report the results in Appendix A.
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Table 4
Evidence of career concerns.
Independent variable Panel A Panel B
Dependent variable
CAR (−1, +1) EBC % CAR (−1, +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Equity-Based Comp. (%) −0.0475*** −0.0347** −0.0280
(−2.81) (−2.25) (−1.60)
Residual EBC% −0.0303** −0.0472***
(−2.54) (−2.67)
Stock (%)
CEO Age −0.00383*
(−1.79)
CEO Age 0.000661 0.0000547
(1.25) (0.18)
EBC%×CEO Age −0.00198*
(−1.73)
Residual EBC%×CEO Age −0.00196*
(−1.77)
CEO Duality −0.00810 −0.00433 −0.00828 −0.0101
(−1.23) (−0.40) (−1.06) (−0.41)
New CEO is Outsider 0.0236*** 0.0254* 0.0181 0.0402
(2.98) (1.97) (1.55) (1.32)
Board Strength −0.00526 −0.00577 −0.0104** −0.0163
(−1.39) (−1.07) (−2.11) (−0.89)
LN (Assets) 0.00495** 0.00351 0.00503 0.0449***
(2.44) (0.95) (1.20) (5.98)
Leverage (%) 0.000328** 0.000505** −0.000320 0.000220
(2.27) (2.58) (−0.45) (0.29)
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Ind. Adj. ROA −0.0000121 −0.0000151 0.0000328 −0.0000158
(−1.01) (−0.89) (0.26) (−0.41)
Tobin’s Q −0.00425 −0.00952** 0.0354 −0.00172
(−0.91) (−2.15) (0.64) (−0.12)
2-Digit SIC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 583 304 279 583 583 583
Adj. R2 0.063 0.065 0.038 0.067 0.016 0.021
Dependent variables: “CAR (−1, +1)” is the dependent variable for regressions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 and represents the CEO succession announcement cumulative abnormal return from day −1
to day +1. “EBC %” is the dependent variable for the regression 4 and represents the successor’s total equity compensationmeasured as a percentage of the successor’s total compensation.
Independent variables: Panel A, “Total Equity-Based Comp. (%)” represents the successor’s total equity compensation measured as a percentage of total compensation measured at year
+1. “CEO Age” represents the difference between the successor’s and predecessor’s age at year 0. “EBC%×CEO Age” is an interaction variable between “Total Equity Comp. (%)” and
“CEO Age”. “CEO Duality =1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds the title of both CEO and Chairman of the board. “New CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1” represents
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor is an outsider and equal to 0 otherwise. “Board Strength” is a factor loading variable using factor analysis to combine % Outside Directors,
the inverse of Board Size, # Board Meetings, Outside Director Tenure, % Outside Directors on Comp Comm., the inverse of Comp Comm. Size, and # Comp Comm. Meetings. “Total Assets
(Mil)” represents the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s total asset size (in millions of dollars) at year +1. “Leverage” represents the ﬁrm’s leverage at year +1. “Ind. Adj. ROA” represents the
ﬁrm’s industry adjusted return on assets at year +1.“Tobin’s Q” represents the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q at year +1. All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC and year (not reported in
the tables). Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. Regression 1 reports results for the full sample. Regression 2 reports results for successor CEO’s whose age is less than the median
successor CEO age. Regression 3 reports results for successor CEO’s whose age is greater than the median successor CEO age.
Panel B: “Residual EBC%” represents the residual from regression 4. “CEO Age” represents the CEO age at year 0. “CEO Age” represents the difference between the successor’s and
predecessor’s age at year 0. “Residual EBC%×CEO Age” is an interaction variable between “Residual EBC%” and “CEO Age”. “CEO Duality =1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1
if the CEO holds the title of both CEO and Chairman of the board. “New CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor is an outsider and equal
to 0 otherwise. “Board Strength” is a factor loading variable using factor analysis to combine % Outside Directors, the inverse of Board Size, # Board Meetings, Outside Director Tenure, %
Outside Directors on Comp Comm., the inverse of Comp Comm. Size, and # Comp Comm. Meetings. “Total Assets (Mil)” represents the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s total asset size (in
millions of dollars) at year +1. “Leverage” represents the ﬁrm’s leverage at year +1. “Ind. Adj. ROA” represents the ﬁrm’s industry adjusted return on assets at year +1.“Tobin’s Q” represents
the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q at year +1. All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC and year (not reported in the tables). Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 10%.
** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 5%.
*** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 1%.
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Also, as an additional test, we examine the market reaction to equity-based pay for the successor
CEO using two subsamples split at median successor CEO age. Regressions 2 and 3 report results
reports results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of regression Eq. (5) on subsamples split at
median successor CEO age. Regression 2 reports results for the younger successor CEO subsample.
The estimated coefﬁcient on equity-based compensation % is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Regression 3 reports results for the older successor CEO subsample. The estimated coefﬁcient on
equity-based compensation % is not signiﬁcant. Again, the results are more consistent with the career
concerns hypothesis. The market reacts less favorably to CEO succession announcements for young
CEO’s where the successor CEO’s contract contains a high percentage of equity-based compensation.
Lastly, our career concerns hypothesis predicts that the optimal compensation contract optimizes
total incentives, the combination of implicit incentives from career concerns (i.e. the labor market)
and explicit incentives from the compensation contract.When implicit incentives areweakest (i.e. the
CEO is near retirement), compensation should bemore closely tied to performance. Conversely, when
career concerns are stronger (i.e. the CEO is longer from retirement, such as with new CEOs), it may be
optimal for current pay to be independent of performance. Therefore there will be a positive market
reaction to increases in performance insensitive pay (i.e. salary) and a negative market reaction to
increases in performance sensitive pay in the successor CEO’s contract.
Overall, our results appear to support this conclusion. However, the market may also be reacting
to agency problems ormanagerial risk-aversion effects associatedwith increases in equity-based pay,
rather than a suboptimal incentive contract given career concerns. For example, Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker (2002) argue that high option compensation is symptomatic of a managerial-owner agency
problemwheremanagers use option compensation to camouﬂage the CEO’s true payoff. To the extent
thatmanagers are undiversiﬁedwith respect to ﬁrm-speciﬁcwealth, increasing equity-based paymay
induce managers to reduce the overall risk of the ﬁrm which would likely reduce shareholder value.
Guay (1999) and Ross (2004), for example, present models in which the concavity of the manager’s
utility function dominates the convexity of the compensation payoff inducing mangers to be more
risk averse.
We address this issue by examining whether the percentage of equity-based pay in the successor
CEO’s pay contract is related to the contracting environment of the ﬁrm by treating the percentage
of equity-based pay as a dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, if the negative market reaction to the per-
centage of equity-based compensation awarded to the successor CEO is due to agency problems, ﬁrms
increasing the percentage of equity-based compensation in the successor CEO’s pay contract might
have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms.
Table 4, Panel B, regression 4, reports results of the percentage of equity-based pay on CEO char-
acteristics, and board and ﬁrm characteristics for the successor CEO. The estimated coefﬁcient on the
successor CEO’s age is negative and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). The percentage of equity-based com-
pensation in the new CEO’s pay contract is inversely related to age. The younger the successor CEO,
the greater the proportion of equity-based pay in his contract.16 The estimated coefﬁcient on board
strength is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that the observed increase in equity-based compensation in the
successor CEO’s pay contract is not likely the result of agency problems within the ﬁrm.
As a ﬁnal test, we examinewhether the negativemarket reaction to the percentage of equity-based
compensation is related to excess equity-based compensation in the successor CEO’s pay contract.
Regression 5 reports results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates using the residual from ﬁrst-
stage regressions of the percentage of equity-based pay on CEO and ﬁrm characteristics (Table 4, Panel
B, Regression 4) as a proxy for excess equity-based compensation. Again, the estimated coefﬁcient for
the residual EBC% is negative and signiﬁcant (at the 5% level). The market reacts less favorably to
providing excess equity-based incentives to successor CEOs. This result supports the career concerns
hypothesis. However, as a ﬁnal test we also create an interaction variable between residual EBC% and
16 Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that younger CEOs would need less equity-based pay since they would be compensated
in the managerial labor market with future income for good performance. We ﬁnd, that on average, the younger executives
receive greater equity-based pay. This may explain the negative stock market reaction associated with successions providing
the new CEO with greater equity-based pay.
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thedifference in CEOagebetween thepredecessor CEOand successor CEO. Regression6 reports results
testing the moderating effect of change in CEO age. The estimated coefﬁcient on the residual EBC% is
negative and signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) and the estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction term is also
negative and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). Our results suggest that younger successor CEOs receive
greater equity-based compensation than older successors. However, the market reacts less favorably
to ﬁrms providing younger successor CEO’s with excess equity-based incentives.
Overall, our results imply that the observed negative market reaction to the percentage of equity-
based pay is driven by suboptimal structuring in the compensation contract with respect to the career
concerns of the CEO. The market reacts less favorably to CEO succession announcements where the
successor CEO’s pay contract contains a higher percentage of equity-based compensation and the
CEO is younger. Of note, we also observe that the percentage of equity-based pay in the successor
CEO’s pay contracts is decreasing in CEO age, which suggests that boards consider retention when
setting CEO pay. In practice ﬁrms load large amounts of equity-based compensation on younger CEO
successors in an attempt to improve retention. However, the negative coefﬁcient on an interaction
variable testing themoderating effect of change in CEO age and the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
on the equity-based compensation % variable for younger CEO’s suggests that the market reacts less
favorably to this practice. Furthermore, the negative coefﬁcient on the residual (a measure of excess
compensation) suggests that this reaction is due to ﬁrms providing younger CEO’s with unnecessary
monetary incentives. Similarly, the market reacts less favorably to excess compensation when the
change in CEO age is high. Given that younger CEO’s also have high external market incentives from
career concerns; our results suggest that boards should consider both internal and external incentives
when setting the pay contract for new CEOs.
6. Robustness tests
For robustnesswe run several additional tests to determine if our results are drivenbyother factors.
The results are reported in Appendix A.
6.1. Changes in compensation structure
Our previous regressions report results using the level of equity-based compensation in the suc-
cessor CEO’s pay contract as the primary independent variable. However, the market reaction may
also be driven by the difference in compensation structure between the successor CEO’s and the pre-
decessor CEO’s pay contract. For robustness, we rerun our results on changes rather than levels. The
estimated coefﬁcient on the change in total percentage of equity-based compensation is negative and
signiﬁcant, which is consistent with our previous conclusions.
6.2. Predecessor CEO characteristics
While we examine the level of equity-based compensation in the successor CEO’s pay contract, it
may also be the case that themarket reaction is due to suboptimal characteristics of only the predeces-
sorCEO’s contract (i.e. too little equity-basedcompensation). For robustness,we rerunour resultsusing
predecessor CEO characteristics. The estimated coefﬁcient on the total percentage of equity-based
compensation is positive but not signiﬁcant. The results suggest that the inverse relation between the
percentage of equity-based pay in the successor CEO’s pay contract and the announcement window
CAR is due to the compensation contract for the incoming CEO rather than only the characteristics of
the outgoing CEO’s compensation contract.
6.3. Level of compensation in dollars
The market may be reacting to changes in the dollar value of pay rather than changes in structure
(%). Therefore, we rerun our analysis using total equity-based compensation in dollars ($) and total
compensation in dollars ($). The estimated coefﬁcients on both variables are not signiﬁcant.
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6.4. Extended announcement window
We also rerun our results using a 6-day announcementwindow (days 0 to +5) to account for delays
in reportingmaterial changes innamedexecutiveofﬁcerpay contracts in an8-k.Again, our conclusions
are unchanged.
7. Conclusion
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that in the presence of career concerns, explicit incentives (e.g.
current compensation based on performance) may not be optimal. So, for executives early in their
career, performance-based pay may not be the optimal form of compensation. We ﬁnd evidence that
although the stock market reacts favorably to succession announcements; it reacts less positively to
successions in which the new CEO receives greater equity-based pay. We interpret this ﬁnding as
evidence that is consistent with Gibbons and Murphy.
Appendix A.
See Table A.1 and Table A.2
Table A.1
Robustness tests of key variables.
Independent variable Dependent variable
CAR (−1, +1) CAR (0, +5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Equity-Based Comp. (%) −0.0268*
(−1.99)
Predecessor EBC (%) 0.0106
(0.51)
Successor EBC ($) −1.40×107
(−0.44)
Successor Total Comp. ($) −02.57×107
(−0.69)
Successor EBC (%) −0.0297*
(−1.80)
CEO Age 0.000252 0.000345 0.000333 0.000329 0.000165
(0.47) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) (0.29)
CEO Duality −0.00938 −0.00870 −0.00851 −0.00865 −0.00924
(−1.46) (−1.34) (−1.26) (−1.28) (−1.02)
CEO is Outsider 0.0221*** 0.0216*** 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0277**
(2.90) (2.96) (2.93) (2.94) (2.33)
Board Strength −0.00464 −0.00432 −0.00444 −0.00443 0.000467
(−1.44) (−1.36) (−1.40) (−1.40) (0.11)
LN (Assets) 0.00406* 0.00317 0.00352 0.00375 0.00368
(1.70) (1.07) (1.28) (1.34) (1.31)
Leverage (%) 0.000277 0.000291* 0.000303* 0.000300* 0.0000326
(1.63) (1.77) (1.93) (1.89) (0.21)
Ind. Adj. ROA −0.00000793 −0.0000102 −0.0000119 −0.0000119 −0.0000217*
(−0.66) (−0.86) (−1.08) (−1.07) (−1.69)
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Table A.1 (Continued )
Independent variable Dependent variable
CAR (−1, +1) CAR (0, +5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobin’s Q −0.00393 −0.00413 −0.00423 −0.00417 0.0182***
(−1.03) (−1.03) (−1.08) (−1.07) (3.42)
2-Digit SIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 583 583 583 583 583
Adj. R2 0.059 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.049
Dependent variables: “CAR (−1, +1)” is the dependent variable for the ﬁrst four regressions and represents the CEO succession
announcement cumulative abnormal return from day −1 to day +1. “CAR (0, +5)” is the dependent variable for the ﬁfth regres-
sion and represents the CEO succession announcement cumulative abnormal return from day 0 to day +5.
Independent variables: “Total Equity-Based Comp. (%)” represents the difference between the successor’s total equity compen-
sationmeasured as a percentage of total compensationmeasured at year +1 and the predecessor’s total equity compensation as
a percentage of total compensation measured at year −1. “Predecessor EBC (%)” represents the predecessor’s total equity com-
pensationmeasured as a percentage of total compensationmeasured at year −1. “Successor EBC ($)” represents the successor’s
equity-based compensation in dollarsmeasured at year +1. “Successor Total Comp. ($)” represents the successor’s total compen-
sation in dollars measured at year +1. “Successor EBC (%)” represents the successor’s total equity compensation measured as a
percentage of total compensationmeasured at year +1. “CEO Age” represents the CEO age at year 0. “CEODuality =1” represents
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds the title of both CEO and Chairman of the board. “CEO is Outsider (Successor) = 1”
represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor is an outsider and equal to 0 otherwise. “Board Strength” is a factor
loading variable using factor analysis to combine % Outside Directors, the inverse of Board Size, # Board Meetings, Outside
Director Tenure, % Outside Directors on Comp Comm., the inverse of Comp Comm. Size, and # Comp Comm. Meetings. “Total
Assets (Mil)” represents the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s total asset size (in millions of dollars) at year +1. “Leverage” repre-
sents the ﬁrm’s leverage at year +1. “Ind. Adj. ROA” represents the ﬁrm’s industry adjusted return on assets at year +1.“Tobin’s
Q” represents the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q at year +1. All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC and year (not reported in
the tables). Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 10%.
** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 5%.
*** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 1%.
Table A.2
Robustness tests of evidence of career concerns by CEO Age.
Sample N (1) %EBC (2) %EBC coefﬁcient (3) %EBC residual
Less than or equal to 45 118 38.44% −0.0414** −0.0509**
(−2.40) (−2.22)
45–50 141 37.56% −0.0172 −0.0309
(−0.82) (−1.03)
50–55 180 34.55% −0.0220 −0.0194
(−1.34) (−1.09)
55–60 104 33.26% −0.0238 −0.0229
(−1.37) (−1.25)
Greater than 60 40 30.65% −0.0134 −0.0376
(−0.30) (−0.73)
Less than or equal to 60 543 −0.0269*** −0.0305***
(−2.91) (−2.61)
Less than or equal to 65 570 −0.0237** −0.0271**
(−2.32) (−2.22)
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Table A.2 (Continued )
Sample N (1) %EBC (2) %EBC coefﬁcient (3) %EBC residual
All 583 35.57% −0.0252*** −0.0312***
(−2.76) (−2.72)
“Sample” represents the ranges of the CEO successor age (≤45, 45–50, 50–55, 55–60, and >60 years). “N” represents the num-
ber of CEO succession announcements. “%EBC” represents the successor’s equity-based compensation as a percentage of the
successor’s total compensation. “%EBC Coefﬁcient” represents the coefﬁcients for cross-sectional regressions of the CEO suc-
cession announcement CAR on the successor’s total equity-based compensation. “%EBC Residual” represents the coefﬁcients
for cross-sectional regressions of the CEO succession announcement CAR on the residual from the ﬁrst stage regressions of the
percentage of equity-based compensation on successor CEO characteristics (Regression 7 from Table 3). Robust t-statistics are
given in parentheses.
** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 5%.
*** Indicate levels of signiﬁcance of 1%.
.
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